FISHER vs. McGIRR ET A1.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

In the Supreme Court, Maeachuetts, March, 1854.
THEOIDORE PISHER VS. PATBIOK M'GIBR ET AL.
1. Where an 'act has been regularly passed by the legislative power, some partions
of which are accordant with, and some repugnant to constitutional pmevisions, the
former will be Tid, and the latter void.
2. From the term, context and purpose of the Massachusetts enatment, commonly
known as the "Maine Liquor Law," it is intended to make the keeping and selling
liquors unlawful, and to bring the offence within the jurisdiction of the local
magistrates.
3. The several sections of the act cited and commented on.
4. It is competent for the law making power to'declare the possession of certain
articles of property, held in particular places and under particular circunistanceg,
to be unlawful, and the property so held may be declared forfeite, -but suck
unlawfulness knd forfeiture must be established and authoized in a manner
consistent with the principles of justice and the established waxim of jurisaprudence, and must pot be repugnant to the provisions of the Declaration of Rights,
or the Constitutin. 'Certain provisions of the statute under discussion are so
repugnant, therefore held unconstitutional and void.
4. This part of the act is unconstittional, because-fat, it warrants and requires
unreasonable searches and seizures. Swond, because it interferes with the regqlation.of foreign commerce. Tird, because the precautions and safeguards for the
security of persons and property are disregarded. Fourth, because the act contains
no provision for the judicial trial of the party accused, such trial berg the only
mode provided in the Declaration of Rights, by which crime can be established
against the citizen. Rfi, because the complaiut setting out the .offenc i' not'
required by the act to do it fully, substntially or formally, ani maehsno
provision for indictment or information, on which issue can be joined and trial had.

The facts fully appear in the opinion, which was delivered by
SHAw, C. J. This case comes before this Court on an appeal
from a judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, upon an agreed
statemient of facts entered into by the parties.: It was an action of
tort, commenced in that court, in the nature of an action of trespass,

for forcibly eitering t1ie plaintiff's dwelling-house, and carrying
away a quantity of brandy and other spirituous liquors, with the
barrels, demijohns, jugs and bottles in which it was contaified.
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The defendants justify the entering of the plaintiff's dwelling-.
house, and the seizure and removal of the liquors, under a searchwarrant issued by a justice of the peace for the county of Barnstable,
and committed to the defendant McGirr, as a constable of Sandwich,
for service. The complaint on which the warrant issued, the
search-warrant, the return 'of the officer thereon, and the proceedings of the magistrate, amongst other things, ordering the destruction
of the liquors, pursuant to the statute of 1852, chapter 322, concerning the manufacture and sale of spirituous liquors, are all made
part of the answer.
Many exceptions. were taken to the course of proceeding under
the act, but -the one which surpasses all others in importance, and
which, if well taken, supersedes all others, is, that all that part of
the statue, directing the seizure and confiscation of liquors kept or
deposited for sale, is unconstitutional and void. We suppose the
principle is now well. understood, that where a statute has been
passed by the Legislature, under all the forms and sanctions
requisite to the making of laws, but some part of which is not

within the competency of legislative power, or is repugnant to any
provision of the Constitution, such part thereofwill be adjudged
void and of no avail, whilst all other parts of the acts, not obnoxious
to the same objection, will be held valid and have the force of law.
There is nothing inconsistent, therefore, in declaring one part of
the same statutavalid, and another part void.
Many questions have heretofore arisen upon various points on
the construction of this statute; but this is the first instance wherein
any question has come up in this Court upon the constitutionality
of the 14th section of the act, being the one under which these
proceedings were had. As it was a question of much general
interest and importance, the Court reserved the case, especially as
they understood that the same question was pending in other
counties, and would probably soon be argued. Other cases have
since been brought up and argued.
Passing over, for the present, all the minor exceptions to the
regularity of these proceedings, we are brought to consider what is
the true construction and legal effect of the 14th section of this act,
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and then, whether its provisions, correctly construed, are contrary
to the Declaration of Rights and the Constitution of this Commonwealth, either in their principle, or in the mode in which they are
to be carried into execution. The section is long and complicated,
and it is not easy, in every m-stance, to ascertain what was intended.
It is nowhere providedin this section, or in any other part of tle
statute, in direct terms, that the keeping, or having liquor deposited
for sale, shall be in itself unlawful, and render the propery.liable
to confiscation, or subject the owner, agent or other depositary to a
penalty therefor. It rather results by implication frOm'-other
provisions; and the general tenor of this section. The. first part of
this section directs, that "if any three persons, voters in the towin
or city where the complaint shall be made, shall, before any justice
of the peace,.or judge of any police court, make comilaint,, under
oath or affirmation, that they have reason to believe, and do believe,
that spirituous or intoxicating liquors are kept, or deposited and
intended for saie, by any person not authorized,".&c., "in any
store, shop , warehouse, or in any steamboat or other vessel, or in
any vehicle of any kind) or in any bulding or place in said city or
towi, said' justice or judge shall issue his warrant or se~xch to any
sheriff," &c., "who shall proceed to search the premises described
in said warrant." Several suggestions -arise ulioi this passage.
The complaint is not required to allege, that any pers6n.in paitioular
has the articles kept or deposited, nor whose -intention to sell them
it is, which renders the keeping unlawful, and subjects the property
to seizure and confiscation. We presume, from the .context and the
purpose of the enactment, that -it miust mean the: intention of the
owner, or his agent, servant, or some person having -itin his power
to make a sale de facto, and thereby to 'make the -mischievous use
of it, which is intended to be -prohibited. .
Again: by the collocation of the terms, in this sentence, it is a
little doubtful whether the words, "in said city or town," -designate
the place within which the liquors are kept; .or qualify the intent
to sell them, vwthin such city or town, in order to make the keeping
of them unlawful; perhaps both are .itended. The former would
seem to be intended to bring them within the jurisdictioi of the
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local magistrates and officers; and unless so kept, with an intent
that said liquor should be sold within such city or town, it would
make the keeping of liquors unlawful, although intended for sale
in another state or foreign country, which we suppose the Legislature could not have intended. It is to be regretted, that in so important a provision, the language should not have been more explicit and free from doubt.
It is obvious, we think, that the complainants are not required,
and have no express authority by the act, to state the name of the
person by whom the liquors are kept; and, as the warrant follows
the complaint, tha Justice is not required, by the statute, to name
such person-; and if practically the name is usually mentioned, it
is probably done as one mode of identifying or describing the place
where the -liquors are alleged to be kept, ds the house or shop of
A. B. in---sreet, &c. The clause goes on-" and if any spirituous or intoxicating liquors are found therein, [the premises described,] he [the officer] shall seize the same, and convey them to
some proper place of security, where he shall keep them until final
action shall be had thereon; and such liquors so seized, together
with the implements of the traffic, may be used in evidence against
any person charged with the unlawful manufacture or sale of
spirituous or intoxicating liquors.
From this last clause, we might be led to imply that if such liquors
were found, it was intended that a new and substantive complaint
should be filed, upon the trial of which they should be evidence.
But, in its terms, they are not to be'used as evidence of an unlawful keeping with intent to sell, but as *evidenceupon.a charge of actual
unlawful manufacture or sale. The statute does not therefore, by
implication, direct or provide for a new complaint for an unlawful
keeping with intent'to sell.
Again: in the same passage, when the complainants have stated
their belief, that liquors intended for sale are kept in a place desig-'
nated, and a warrant is issued to an officer to search such place,
the law requires-and we presume the warrant would necessarily
follow it-not that he shall seize certain liquors described, or in
more general terms, any liquors so kept or deposited for sale, but
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'if any spirituous or intoxicating liquors are found therein, he
shall seize the same." The intent of the Legislature seems .to
have been, that all spirituous liquors, found in such :place, shalj be
taken into the custody of the law, leaving the question whether any
or all of them were kept for sale, or lawfully kept, .o be decided
afterwards,
The section contains a provision for a more special oomplaint, to
warrant the search of a dwelling-house; and then goes on to direct
the proceedings: "The owner or keeper of said liqurs, seized as
aforesaid, if he shall be known to the officer seizing the same, shall
be summoned forthwith before the justice or judge by.. whose warrant the liquors were seized; and if he fail to appear, or unless he
shall prove that said liquors are imported," &c., ."or are kept for
sale by. authority derived under this act, or. ore otherwise lawfully
kept, they shall be declared forfeited, -and-shall be -destroyed ;"
"and the owner or keeper of said, liquoroshall pay a-fine of twenty
dollars' and costs, or stand committed for -thirty days, !a defoult of.
payment, if in the opinion of said, court said liquors sh. have
been kept or deposited foi sale contrary to the provitions of
this Act."
It may be remarked upon this part of the Act, that the fir s't
time any. mention is made of the owner or ke6per, is upon -tke
seizure of the liquors; then; upon the contingency that he is
known to the officer, he is to be sammoned, and if he fail to appear, or unless he can make certain proofa, the liquors are to be
destroyed, and he is to be punished.: The purpose for which he is
summoned seems to be, to inform him of the seizure of the goods, and
enable him to prove them not liable to forfeiture.
Section 15 provides that "if the owner, keeper or. possessor of
liquors, seized under the provisions of this Act, shall- be unknown
to the officers seizing the same, they shall not be condemn ed and destroyed, until they shall have been advertised, with the numhber and
description of the packages, as near as may be, for two weeks, by
posting up a description of the same in some public place, that if
such liquors are actually the property of any city or town,". &a.,
"or the property of some person duly authorized to maiufacture
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and sell such liquors under this Act, and were lawfully inhis possesssion at the time of such seizure, or were otherwise lawfully
kept, they may not be destroyed." The notice is in effect not to
any person in particular, nor to any person in whose possessioft the
liquors were found; but the purpose of the notice, as declared by
the Act, is, that "upon satisfactory proof of such ownership or
lawful possession within said two weeks," the justice may make an
order to deliver them up. The purpose of the notice seems to be
to enable any person to appear and offer such proof, who may have
any interest in obtaining a discharge of the property, upon any of
the grounds aforesaid.
Section 16 directs what proceedings shall be had, in case an
owner or keeper of liquors, seized as aforesaid, shall appeal.
These are all the provisions of the Act, on the subject of the.
seizure of spirituous liquors, kept for sale; they together constitute a system of proceedings, and it seemed necessary to consider
this system as a whole, in order to a better understanding of its
legal and constitutional character.
We think it manifest that the Legislature, in this system of measures, proposes to accomplish one and the same object, by tro diktinct modes of proceeding. The general purpose is to prevent or
diminish the 6vils of intemperance, by the punishment of an indiscriminate sale of spirituous liquors; but the particular purpose in
this series of measures is, to prevent such liquors from being kept
in any place, by any person,'for the purpose, or with the intent
that they shall be sold. Although crimes and offences, punishable
by law, consist in acts done, and not in mere unexecuted purposes
and intentions, yet the more effectually to accomplish the great
and salutary pupose of laws necessary to the well-being of society;
acts and conduct, which would be innocent and indifferent in themselves, arl often declared unlawful, and made punishable, if done
with an intent and purpose, which will render them noxious or dangerous, and where, should the law wait till the criminal Intent is
carried out into action, irremediable mischief will be done. The
law is preventive, as well as remnedial. Thus a person may innocently have in -his possession counterfeit coin or bank notes. But
.80
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if he has them in his possession with intent to pass them as true,
knowing them to be counterfeit, the intention qualifies the act, and
such'act may be justly made punishable. This is the foundation of
many criminal- enactments. The principle is too familiar, to re,
quire extended illustiation.
Supposing the 'object to be a legitimate one-to pevent. and
punish the possession of intoxicating liquors, which leads to tempts,
tion and facilitates the actiial commission of the offence of unlawfully selling, by declaring that possession unlawful, if held with an
intent and purpose of selling unlawfully--we have said- that this
system of measures seems designed to accomplish this one purpose
by two distinct modes or courses of proceeding, both well known to
the law, but of considerable difference in their modes of operation;
the one, a proceeding in rem, by the sequestration- and forfeiture
of the property, or thing which is noxious. in itself, or' made the
instrument or subject of a noxious and injurious one: the other, a
proceeding in personam, for the punishment of the person of the
offender, as an example to deter others from the commission of the
ike offence. . Both *are 'proceedings designed for the enforcement
of the criminal-law, and must be governed by the rules applicable
to its administration.
We have no doubt that it is competent for the Legislature to dedare the possession of certain articles of-property, either, absolutely, or when held in particular places, and under particular
eircumstances, to be unlawful, tecause they would be injurious;
dangerous. or noxious; and by due process of law, by proceedings
ixre., to provide, both for the abatement of the nuisancei anathe
punishment of the offender, by the seizure and confscation of the
property, by the removal, salej or destruction of the .noxious articles. Putrefying merchandise may be stored in a warehousei
where, if it remain, it would spread'contagious disease and death
-thrQugh a community. Gunpowder, an article quite harmnless in a
magazin'e, may be kept in a. warehouse always exposed to fire
especially in the night; however secreted, a fire in the building
would be sure to find it, and the lives and limbs of courageous ,and
public spirited firemen and citizen's, engaged in subduing' the
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flames, would be endangered by a sudden and terrible explosion..
It is of the highest importance, that such persons should receive
the amplest encouragement to their duty, by giving them the
strongest assurance that the law can give them', that they shall not
be exposed to such danger. This can be done only by a rigorous
law against so keeping gunpowder, to be rigorously enforced by
seizure, removal, and forfeiture.
The case of goods smuggled, in violation of the revenue laws,
and the confiscation of vessels, boats, and other vehicles, subservisnt to such unlawful acts, are instances-of the application of
law to proceedings in rem.

The theory of this branch of the law seems to be this: That the
property, of which noxious and injurious use is made, shall be
seized and confiscated, because, either it is so unlawfully used by the
owner, or person having the power of disposal, or by some person
with whom.he has placed and entrusted it, or at least, that he has
so carelessly and negligently used his power and control over it,
that by.his default, it has fallen into the hands of those who have
made, and intend to make, the -noxious and injurious use of it, of
which the public have a right to complain, and from Whioh they
have a right to be relieved. Therefore, as well to abate the nuisance, as to punish the. offending or careless owner, the property
may be justly declared forfeited, and either sold for the public
benefit or destroyed, as the circumstances of the case may require,
and the' wisdom of the Legislature direct. Besides; the actual
seizure of the property, intended to be offensively used, may be
effected, when it would not be practicable to detect and punish the

offender personally.
Supposing, then, that it is competent for the' Legislature, as one
of the means of carrying into effect a law to prohibit the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquors, to declare the keeping of such
liquor for the purpose of sale, in any place, within any city or
town of this Commonwealth, unlawful, and to declare the liquor,
thus kept, liable to seizure and forfeiture as quasi a nuisance,
under a proper and well guarded system of regulations; the question is, whether the measures, directed and authorized by the sta-
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tute in question, are so far inconsistent with the principles of justice, and the established maxims of jurisprudence, intended for the
security of public and private rights, and so repugnant to the provisions of the Declaration of Rights and Constitution of this Commonwealth, that it *as not within the power of the Legislature to
give them the force of law, and that they must therefore be held
unconstitutional and void; and the Court are all of ppinion that
they are.
The Court are not insensible to the great weight of responsibility devolving on them, when they are called to perform the
delicate but important duty of deliberating on the validity and
constitutionality of an act of the Legislature; and they would approach it with all the solicitude which its importance demands.
I. The measures directed by the 14th section of this Act are in
violation of the 14th article of the Declaration of Rights. That
article declares that "every subject has a right to be secure from
all unreasonable searches and seizures of his person, his houses,
his papers, and all his possessions. All warrants, therefore, ari
contrary to this right, if the foundation of them be not previously
supported by oath or affirmation; and if.the order in the warrant
to a civil officer, to make search in suspected places, or to arrest
one or more suspected persons, or to seize their .property, be not
accompanied with Aspecial designation of the persons or objects of
search, arrest, or seizure." The subject of general warrants, and
of illegal searches and seizures under them, had bben much discussed in England before the adoption of our Constitution, and
was probably well understood by its framers. Entick vs. Oarrington, 2 Wils. 275. This case is much more fully reported, and the
judgment of Lord Camden given at length, in 19- Howell's State
Trials, 1029. The measures authorized and directed by this act,
are in violaton'of the principle and spirit of the'article respecting
general warrants and unreasonable searches.
1. Because the act does not require the three persons, who are
to make complaint, to state that .they have reason to believe, and
do believe, that intoxicating liquors are kept or deposited and
intended for sale by any person named; nor does it require the
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magistrate to state, in his warrant to the searching officer, the
name of any person believed to be the owner or keeper of such
liquors, nor the name of any person having the custody or possession thereof, nor the name of any person having the intention to
sell the same. On the contrary, the complaint affects the place
only, and the belief of the complainants that liquors axe kept in
such place, and are intended for sale. In this respect the warrant
is general, not a.fecting any person, even by way of belief or suspicion, of the unlawful act of keeping such liquors for sale.
2. It does not limit the officer's authority and right of seizure to
the articles described, by quantity, quality or marks; nor doei it
even restridt the officer's power of seizure to liquors kept and
intended to be sold, .although it is the avowed purpose of the act to
make -the keeping. of such liquors unlawful, and subject them to forfeiture. But even were it to provide that the search and seizure
should be oonfined to -liquors intended .for sale, it would be open to
another objection, perhaps quite as formidable, which is, that it
would be left to the mere discretion of an executive officer to judge
and decide what were so intended for sale and what were notleaving it to him to decide what to take and what to leae--and
making his decision conclusive. We say conclusive, for if the
seizing officer does not take" them' the magistrate acquires no
jurisdiction over them, and no other tribunal or magistrate can
entertain the question whether they were intended for sale, and so
liable to forfeiture, or not. No liquors, therefore, could be adjudged
forfeited under this section, unless the searching officer should take
and return them, as in his belief intended for sale.
3. Again; if the three persons state their belief that any spirituous liquors are kept or deposited and intended for sale, in any
store, shop or warehouse, or in any steamboat or other vessel, or in
any tehicle, or in any building or place, then the warrant shall
issue, and the sheriff or constable shall proceed to search the premises-that is, the store, vessel or place described-and if any spirituous liquors are found therein, he shall seize the same. Under this
express power and direction, if a few kegs, demijohns or bottles of
liquor are pladed in a warehouse, or on board a ship or steamer, by
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.some person intending to sell them, or under such circumstances
that three respectable persons can safely testify that they believe
that they are so intended for sale, then the officer shall seizip aud
remove the whole stock of the warehouse, or the.whole cargp of the
ship or steamboat, so fAr as it may consist of winq, spirits or intoxicating liquors. This makes it the imperative and indispensable
duty of the officer to seize all the liquors found, however clearly it
may appear to him that the larger quantity is about to be fent to
other Statea, or to a foreign country, and not intieded for sale'in
the city or town where the liquors are found, or even in thq Com*monwealth. This would be equally the -officer's duty, whether. the
•liquors should be found in kegs, or in larger packages, as pipes or
hogsheads. Thus the authority to seize is carried greatly beyond,
the article, the possession of which is made unlawful, and the keeping of wOich is intended to be treated by the act as a nisance; to
wit, spirits kept and intended for sale.
It "ppeais to us, therefore, that this act in terms wa rants and
requires unreasonable searches and seizures, and is therefore contrary to the Constitution.
If it be said that the act provides for as much certainty in the
description of the articles to be searched for and seized, and in the
definition and limitation 'of the officer's power, as'the nature of the
case will admit of; that the complainants cannot kruow with certainty, before search is made, that spirits are deposited in the place
described, or are intenIded for sale, and can only state their belief;
and that neither the complainants nor the magistrate can know,
before search, who is the owner, or has the custody, or intends to
sell, and therefore cannot name him; and that it is impossible for
the complainants or for the searching officer to distinguish. what
part of the liquors found are intended for sale, and that that must
be a subject of inquiry before the magistrate afterwards; the answer
seems to us to be obvious, that if these modes of accomplishing a
laudable purpose, and, of carrying into effect a good and wholesome
law, cannot be pursue .without a violation of the Constitution, they
cannot be pursued at all, and other means must be devised, not
open to such objection.
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4. Another ground is, that if upon a complaint that some.liquors.
are kept in a warehouse, or on board &vessel, believed to be intended for sale, a warrant shall go, and the officer is obliged to
seize all the liquors found in the same store or vessel-and such is
the plain direction of the statute-then the officer must seize such
liquors, though imported and remaining in the original packages (a
cargo of wine and brandy, for instance), and bring them before the
magistrate. This would be an interference with the regulation of
foreign commerce- pladed under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Constitution and Laws of the United States. - And though there is
a provision in this. act, that the owner of sueh imported liquors may
go before the magistrate and obtain their release by proof of the
facts, yet such seizure and detention, perhaps for a long period,
would be in danger of.bringing this power into conflict with the
laws of the United States, which; within their proper sphere, ar
the supreme law of the land.
II. Another ground upon which we .are of opinion that this
section of the act. is unconstitutional is, thatin the commencement and course of proceedings, required and directed by the
series of measures provided for in the act, many of the precautions
and safeguards, for the security of persons and property, and the
most valuable rights of the subject, so sedulously, required and
insisted on in the laws of all well ordered governments, and specially prescribed as the governing rule of the legislature in our
Declaration of Rights, are overlooked and disregarded.
The Declaration of Rights declaries, article 1,, "All men have
certain natural, essential and inalienable rights ;" among others,
"1that of acquiring, possessing and protecting property." Art. 10.
"Each individual has a right to be protected in the enjoyment of
his property, according, to standing laws." Art. 11. "Every
subject ought to find a certain remedy, by having recourse to the
laws, for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive in his person,
property or character. He ought to obtain right and justice freely,
and without being obliged to purchase it; completely, and without
any denial; promptly, and without delay; conformably to the laws."
Art. 12. "1 o subject shall be held to answer .for any crime or
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offence, until the same is fully and plainly, substantially and formally, described to him; or be compelled to accuse, or furnish evidenae against himself; and every subject shall have a right to
produce all proofs that may be favorable to him; to meet the witnesses against him face to face, and to be fully heard in his
defence;" "and no subject shall be arrested, imprisoned, despoiled
or deprived of his property, immunities or privileges, put out of the
protection of the law, exiled or deprived of his life, liberty or
estate; but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land."
These are homely and familiar maxims, scarcely requiring citation, and yet the Declaration of Rights itself (Art. 18), admonishes
us that a frequent recurrence to them is absolutely necessary, to
preserve the advantages of liberty and maintain a free government;*
and that the 'people have a right to require of their lawgivers and
magistrates an exact and constant observance of them.
In comparing the section in question with these injunctions of the
Declaration of Rights, the first thing to be .remarked is, that it
vests extraordinary and unusual poweq in justices of the peace, not
merely as to the taking of preliminary measures, such as receiving
and verifying complaints, issuing warrants of search and arrest, and
the like; but also invests them with jurisdiction to adjudicate upon
an unlimited amount of property.

There can be no doubt that spirituous liquors, at least before
they are judicially and finally coifiscated and ordered to be
destroyed, are property; this act so recognizes them.
1. Then recurring to the course of proceeding under this statute, the first step required is the complaint of three persons, ea
parte; and no provision is made that in any stage of the proceeding these complainants are to be again examined, nor that the
party whose property is taken shall have opportunity.to meet them
face to face; yet, as we shall see, their oath, to their belief of a
certain fact, is the only evidence,upon which the property may be
adjudged forfeited.
There is n6 provision or direction that the name of any person
may be inserted in the complaint or in the warrant; and if the
complainants or the magistrate do name a person in the warrant as
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an owner, or one having possession, it is no direction or authorityto the officer to summon such person, either to defend the property,
or answer to any complaint. The direction in the statute is, that
the sheriff or constable shall search the premises described in the
warrant, and if any spirituous liquors are found therein, he shall
seize the same, "and the owner or keeper of said liquors seized as
aforesaid, if he shall be known to the officer seizing the same, shall
be summoned forthwith before the justice or judge," and if he fail
to appear, or unless he can prove that they are lawfully kept, they
shall be declared forfeited, and shall be destroyed. It depends on
the contingency of the owner or keeper being known to the officer,
be he named in the warrant as such or not, whether anybody is
summoned or has notice. If the officer returns the name of some
person as owner or keeper, and such person does not forthwith
appear, then the liquor may be adjudged forfeited, without further
notice or proof. Theofficer, who of course must act upon hearsay
and the best information he can obtain,, however honestly he may
endeavor to ascertain the truth, may be mistaken in his return of
the name of a person as owner or keeper; then the property may
be confiscated and destroyed without any opportunity given the
true owner to appear and defend.
2. But, suppose the officer happens to be right, and the owner
has notice, the notice is, to appear forthwith. No day in Court
is given, no allowance made for the contingency of the owner's
absence, or sickness, or engagements. 'No provision is made that
personal notice shall be given, or that proceedings shall be postponed until personal notice be given. A summons at the owner's
last usual place of abode would be good service, where not otherwise
specially directed. Upon such constructive notice, which may not*
reach the owner personally, and which from its shortness is very
likely not to reach him until after the confiscation and destruction
of the property, if he fail to appear forthwith, the .property may
be declared forfeited, and the party whose name is thus returned
as owner or keeper, may have judgment against him personally for
a penalty and costs.
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TIeve measures seem wholly inconsistent with the right of defending one's property, and of finding a safe remedy in the laws.
3. But if the owner or keeper shall be unknown to the officer
seizing the liquor, they shall not be condemned and destroyed until
they shall have been advertised, with the number, &c., for two
weeks, by posting up a written description in some public place,
'that if such liquors are actually the property of any city or town,
purchased for sale by the agent for medicinal, mechanical or chemical purposes only, or of some person duly authorized, or are otherwise lawfully kept, they may not be destroyed; but upon satisfactory proof of such ownership within said two weeks before the
justice or judge, he shall deliver to the agent, &c., an order to the
officer to deliver them up. Whether such a written advertisement
posted in one. place is adequate public notice, it is for the legislature to decide. The manifest objection to this notice is, that it
fixes no time or place at which a claimant miay appear with his
evidence, and have a trial, and meet the witnesses face to face., It,
presupposes that he is to appear and offer his proofs, at any time,
when the magistrate may be found, and is ready and willing to hear
him, and receive and consider his proofs. It looks to no trial; but
assumes that the liquors are to be condemned, unless a claimant
can make such proof.
The theory, upon which a judgment iM rem is regarded as a
judgment binding upon. all the world, is, that all the world have
constructive notice of the seizure, with the cause and purpose of
the taking, and the time and place at which any person may appear
before a competent tribunal and have a trial, before the condemnation of his property.
Supposing the process in rem, when rightly conducted, is a suitable and proper mode of enforcing obedience to a useful -and salutary
law,. it does it by'punisbing the offender, Wvho must be the owner,
or sorae person entrusted with t06 possession by him, or some person for whose unlawful possession of it the owner is responsible; it
does this by depriving, such owner of his property, at the same
time preventing the further noxious and unlawful use. of it. Such
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being the character of the prosecution, in a high degree penal in
its operation and consequences; it should be surrounded with all
the safeguards necessary to the security of the innocent, having the
full benefit of the maxim, that every person shall be presumed innocent until his guilt be established by proof. He should have notice
of the charge of guilty purpose, upon which his property is declared
to be unlawfully held, and in danger of being forfeited, a time and
opportunity to prepare his defence, an opportunity to meet the
-witnesses against him face to face, and the benefit of the legal presumption of innocence.
4. But there is another objection to the constitutionality of this
law, of a more formidable character, and as it appears to us, quite
decisive of the case. Supposing the owner of the liquor to have full
notice, to have appeared before the magistrate, and to have had full
opportunity to procure evidence and prepare for trial; no provision
is made by the statute for a trial, for a determination by judicial
proofs of the facts, upon the truth of which alone the property can
be justly confiscated aild destroyed. On the contrary, the statute
expressly directs, that if the owner fail to appear, or (that is, if he
does appear) unless he shall prove that the liquors were lawfully
kept, they shall be declared forfeited, and the owner shall be
adjudged to pay a fine and costs. There is no room for implication;
the judgment shall pass for the forfeiture and fine, unless the 6wner
can prove that they were lawfully kept. This is the most favorable
provision made for him. The judgmenti, then, passes without trial
and without proof, unless that which-preceded the seizure, and the
seizure itself, are to be considered as legal proof.
To see whether any trial is provided for, we must first ask what
is to be tried. The case supposes, that the keeping of spirituous,
liquors, intended for'sale, is made unlawful by the statute itself;
that the illegality consists in the intent of selling; that the intent
qualifies the act of keeping, and impresses on the property illegally
kept, the character of a nuisance, which makes it lawful to seize the
property thus made the instrument of an illegal purpose, and
confiscate and destroy it. This is done, as well to remove and
abate the nuisance, and prevent the illegal use of it, as to punish
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the owner, upon whom ultimately the loss must fall, by a deprivation
of property, in the nature of a penalty. What, then, is the fact
upon which any adjudication must proceed? Clearly keeping with
an intent to sell. As keeping, without such intent, would not be
illegal, the whole criminality of the act, as well that which affects
the owner or keeper personally, as that which'stamps the character
of illegality-upon the property, is the intent to sell It. This intent
must be that of the owner, or of his agent, servant or bailee, having
acquired through him the possession and the actual power to sell it.
The intent of a mere stranger, having no possession or control over
it, could not bring it within the act and render the possession
unlawful. The fact, then, to be proved-the main, the indispensable
fact, in order to render the keeping illegal, and without which there
is no legal groumd for a penal judgment--is the intent of the owner,
or other person in possession of the property, to sell it in violation
of the law. Now, we can perceive no provision for the trial and
proof of this offence of keeping liquors with illegal intent, in any
sense in which a judicial trial is understood, in which'a party charged
with an offence, for which his propertymay be taken from him and
confiscated, may stand on his defence, a4d have the presumption of
innocence, until proofs are adduced against him to establish the
crime"or misdemeanor with which he is charged. Such a trial alone
can satisfy the express provision in the Ddelaratibn of Rights, Art.
12, which. declares that no subject shall be arrested, or deprived of
his property, immunities, or privileges, or of his life, liberty, or
estate, but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land.
These expressions have been understood, from Magnza (arta to
the present time, to mean a trial by jury, in a regular course of
legal and judicial proceedings.
In order to ascertain whether provision is made for such a trial,
we must look to the statute, and see upon what grounds a judgment
of forfeiture shall be had. The warrant is issued; the goods
including all liquors found at the place designated, are seized and
detained by the officer, subject tothe order of the justice; and the
owner or keeper is summondd.. What is then to be done? The
statute answers: If he fail to appear, or unless he can proye that
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the said liquors are of foreign production, imported, &c., contained
in the original packages, and in quantities not les than the laws
of the United States prescribe; or are kept for sale by authority
derived under this act, that is, by an agent of the city or town); or
are otherwise lawfully kept; they shall be declared forfeited. The
most favorable privilege offered to tHe owner is, that he may prove,
if he can, that the liquor was lawfully kept. If he offers no proof,
or fails to satisfy the magistrate, then they are to be declared
forfeited. But upon what proof? The act seems to presuppose
that a prima facie case of unlawful keeping has been established,
upon which, unless kebutted, a judgment may pass; but again, we
ask, upon what preceding evidence has any prima facie case been
proved? The oath of the original complainants could be no proof,
for many reasons: It was ex parte and made for another purpose,
to wit, to obtain a warrant; it states their belief that some liquors
were kept in the store, vessel or place described, upon which all the
liquors there found, as well as those to which the oath may have
been intended to apply, as all others, were seized, brought under
the control of the magistrate, and now stand before him for their
deliverance, which must depend upon his adjudication; But. such a
complaint, if it could be held to apply to all the goods seizedcould
on no principle be regarded as evidence on a trial. If the complainants, respectable as they are required to be, were to be regarded
as witnesses, their preliminary examination is ex parte; they are

not required to appear before the magistrate afterwards, and after
some person has been summoned; and the accused has no opportunity to meet them face to face. An indictment is far more precise
and explicit, charging all the particulars of an offence with technical
accuracy, and is found on the oath of at least twelve men, upon.
evidence given on oath. As well, therefore, might a statute provide,
that upon an indictment being read, the party charged shoild be
convicted, unless he could prove that he was not guilty. Yet, up
to the time of the appearance of the respondent before the magistrate, such preliminary complaint is the only semblance of evidence
of any criminal intent, to render the owner or keeper liable, either
to the forfeiture of the property, or to a judgment for a penalty.
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The fact that the liquor was found in the custody of the respondent
when seized, is no evidence of unlawful intent to sell. The place,time and circumstances, and the mode in which it is kept, if proved
by witnesses, might be evidence of such- intent. But no such testimony is required; and what we mean to say is, that the finding of
the liquor, the fact of seizure, and the custody by the officer, afford
no evidence of that intent, which makes the property liable to
forfeiture, .and subjects the keeper to a penalty.
These considerations apply to the property of those intended by
the complainants to be charged as the guilty owners or keepers;
but who, before judgment of forfeiture, are entitled"to a fair trial.:
But they apply with greatly increasea force, "to those, not even believed by the complainants to be' guilty owners or keepers, but;
whose liquors in the same warehouse or vessel, ari swept by the
statute, and the proceedings under it, into the same net, and are in
danger of the same condemnation, by a judgment, without the trial
assured by the Declaration of Rights. We have only to' look at
the plain directions of the act, to perceive that it provides- for no'
trial, in any proper or judicial sense; that it perndits and requires
a judgment of forfeiture, if no proof, or if proof not satisfactory
to the magistrate, is offered by the respondent. In thiis- respect,.
this enactment is in violation of the plain dictates of justice, and
contrary to the letter and spirit of the Deblara~tfn of Rights.
This statute declares that a subject may be deprived- of his property under the forms of law, without meeting the' witnesses face
to face, without being fully heard in his defence, in an unusual
mode, not by the judgment of his peers or the law or the 1land.
Probably it was not the intention of the Legislstttre to direct a
proceeding subversive of the rights of the subject; and it*is quite,
probable that magistrates and courts, acting in confornifty with the
more familiar and established maxims governing the administiation
of justice, have required proofs on the part of the prosecutor, and
given to respondents some of the privileges of a defendant, before
proceeding to 'a judgment. But, in order to judge of the conformity of the enactment with the requisites of the Constitution,
we must be governed by the terms and provisions of the'act
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itself, and cannot construe it according to any presumed intention
of the Legislature not expressed; especially against an' expressed
direction.
In a law directing a series of measures, which in their operation,
are in danger of encroaching upon private rights; vesting in subordinate officers large powers, which, when most carefully guarded,
are liable to be mistaken or abused, and which are to direct, limit
and regulate the judicial conduct of a large class of magistrates ;
it is highly impoitant that the powers conferred, and the practical
directions given, be so clear and well defined i that they may serve
as a safe guide to all such officers and magistrates, in their respective duties; .and in these respects, the statute itself must, on its
face, be conformable to the Constitution.
We have already alluded to section 16 as one of this series of measures, which provides that "if any owner or keeper of liquors,
seized as aforesaid, shall appeal," &c.-upon which it is proper to
make one or two remarks. It is obvious, that this section does not
give an appeal in terms, but only hypothetically; nor does it
state from what judgment; but we presume it to be from the entire
judgment, for forfeiture and-fine. It is further to be noticed, that
tlie appellate court is not authorized in terms to render a judgment
against the appellant for a fine. But it is important to cite all
that part of the section which directs what final judgment the appellate court are to give. It is as follows: "If the final dicision
shall be against the appellant, that such liquors were intended by
him for" sale, contrary to the provisions of this act, then such
liquors shall be destroyed, as provided in section fourteen."i If
this clause had stood alone, it might have been plausibly, perhaps
strongly' argued, that by such "final decision," that such liquorswere intended by the appellant for sale, must be understood a j1dicial decision, to be arrived at in a regular course of trial, upon
allegations and proof; thus by implication intending a trial according to the maxims and forms of law. It is hardly to be presumed
that the Legislature intended to direct a different mode of trial
and form of judgment in the appellate court; contrary to the common theory of appeal, which is to enable a higher court, in a case
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depending upon the same state of facts and the same rule of law,
to re-examine the judgment of a lower court, and affirm or reverse
the judgment; though perhaps it would be in the power of the Legislature-to do so, by words sufficiently express to matifest such intention. But if such were the intention, it would leave the objeotions
already made in full force.
If it should be urged that, upon' the maxim of construction,
that every part of a statute may be resorted to, for expounding
every other part, this clause manifests the intention of the Legislature, that a regular trial shall be had in -the proceedings before themagistrate; the answer is, that the directions in regard to the pro'ceedings there, and to those preliminary thereto; as well when
there is no appearance and no power of appeal, as when there is;
are too plain,, explicit and mandatory, to admit of any such construction.. Besides; the rights of parties ought not to be made to
depend on a doubtful interpretation of various, and in some respects, incompatible and conflicting provisions.
It may be proper slightly to notice an objection to -the constititionality of this law,.in so far as it directs the taking of private
property for public use, without making any compensation therefor; contrary to-article 12 of the Declaration of Rights. We are
of opinion, that that clause has no bearing on, and no connection
with, this subject.. It is a most wise and' salutary principle; but
relates to another class of subjects and of. rights. If spirituous
liquor is rightfully taken at all, it is on the ground that it .is
illegally kept; that being so kept, it is noxious to thle public, and
de facto a nuisance; and when it is adjudged forfeited, it is because
it is so noxious and declared to be such by law, the owner's right of
property is divested by the judgment, and he can have no :claim to
compensation.
II. Thus far we have considered this section, as it directs proceedings in ret to effect the forfeiture and destruction of liquors.
But it also authorizes a judgment for a fine and costs, with an
alternative seritence to .imprisonment thirty days, in case of nonpayment; and it is contended that, as a proceeding in peronam,
it is equally repugnant to the Constitution.
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If this branch of the act treats the case as a proceeding in the
administration of criminal justice, to recover a penalty, for a violation of the statute law of the Commonwealth, it is to be commenced, prosecuted and conducted, in the manner required by the
Constitution.
Article 12 of the Declaration of Rights, directs (in. addition to
the other provisions, common to both modes of prosecution) that
no subject shall be held to answer for any crime or oence, until
the same is fully-and plainly, substantially and formally, described
to him. Art. 14. "All warrants, therefore, are. contrary to this
right, [to be secure from searches' and -seizures,] if the cause, or
foundation of them be not previously supported by oath or affirmation."
The offence intend ed to be declared and punished, by this section, is keeping or depositing spirituous liquor, in any shop or vessel, &c., intended for sale. The statute, after the provisions for a
seizure, forfeiture and destruction of the liquor, proceeds to add,
that "the owner or keeper of said liquor shall pay a fine. of $20
and costs, or stand committed for thirty days, in -default of payment, if in the opinion of said court, said liquors shall have been
kept or deposited for sale, contrary to the provisions of tbe act."
The statute does not, distinctly, and in terms, make the keeping
of liquors intended for sale a distinct, substantive - offence, punishable by fiie; but only circuitously and by implication, through the
medium -of a search, seizure and forfeiture. The statute does not
require the complainants to state, either as fact or, belief, that the
defendant, or any person designated, has kept; or is keeping liquor
for sale, contrary to law. On the contrary, it seems studiously to
avoid naming any body; by requiring the complainants to state
their belief, that liquors are kept and intended for sale, in the place
designated; seeming to look to the result of the search to be m~ade
on the warrant, which is to issue on the complaint, to ascertain
whether liquors are so kept, and by whom. When they are seized
by the officer, the owner or keeper is to be summoned by him, not in
pursuance of any direction in the warrant, but upon his own knowledge. Summoned for what? Not apparently to answer to any
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complaint against him personally; but to enable him to look after
his property thus seized, and defend it, if he can. The only cognizance which the magistrate can take, the only jurisdiction he has
over the person of any one as owner or keeper, is that derived from
the return of the officer, on his search-warrant; he certifies that
he has seized certain liquors described, and summoned a person
named, as one whom he knows to be* the owner or keeper of the
liquors seized. The jutisdiction of the person, such as it is, is incidental to the jurisdiction over the property, obtained by the seizure.
2. But could we regard this as a statute making the keeping 6f
liquor intended for sale, a. distinct substantive offence, punishable
by fine, and giving jurisdiction of it to a Justice of the Peace, as
an ordinary case in personam, still we think it fails to conform to
the Constitution, in the articles above cited. There is no complaint setting forth the offence, either fully, substantially or form:~ly. ~The complaint, required to be made by three yoters, has
-accomplished its office, when it has, laid the foundation for the
search-warrant. The complaint, if it follows the statute, names
nogme as a party chargeable with the offence of unlawfuly keeping;
there is no-warrant or procees to arrest or summon such person;
on the contrary, the officer is directed to summon the owner or
keeper, if known to him. Suppose the complainant, though not
Teqvired by the statute, should' name some person as owner or
'keeper, and the officer, upon search, should summon another perse as one known to him to be the owner or keeper; which is the
person charged? Which is amenable to the law; and liable to
judgment 'of ine and imprisonment? Amnd against which of them
can the magistate render a judgment in personam?
The specific ground on which this part of the statute directing
proceedings i2 personam is -repugnant to the provisions of the
Constitutian, is, that, considered as a charge of crime or offence, there
is no provision for an indictment, information or complaint, on oath
or otherwise, in which the specific offence of keeping or depositing
opirituous liquors intended for sale, is in any way described, so that
it can be put on record and traversed, or an issue thereon be joined
and tried'in due course of law.
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The return of the officer, which alone can bring before the magistrate the name of an owner or keeper, cannot satisfy the requisites
of the Constitution; it is not a direct charge against him of keeping
liquor, intended for sale; he is not summoned to answer siieh a
charge, but to inform him of the seizure; and the charge is not on
oath. The judgment to be rendere4, for fine and costs, is not a
distinct, independent judgment, on a charge of- a personal offence,
but is only incidental to a judgment of forfeiture and confiscation
The provision in regard to the judgment in perof property.
sonam is, after directing that the liquor shall be forfeited and destroyed, that the owner or keeper of said liquor shall pay a fine of
$20, &c., "if in the opinion of said court, said liquors shall, have
-been kept or deposited for sale contrary to the provisios'of this
act."' Now, supposing this should be construed to mean a judicial
opinion, formed upon examination and proof, it would be obnoxious
to the objection s of being repugnant to the "Constitution: First,because it would be a conviction for a penalty, without any substafLtial and formal charge described and set forth, with opportunity to
defend contrary to the Declaration of Rights ; and, secondly, be-*
cause the matter of fact of which an opinion is to be formed, in
order to convict, is not that the respondent, whose name has been
xeturned as owner or keeper, has kept the liquor with intent to sell;
but only that the liquors were kept for sale, which might be true, if
kept by any other person. A party therefore may be convicted
and sentenced to fine and costs, and imprisonment, for an offence
neither legally charged, nor legally proved, to have been committed
by him.
. In this case of Fishervs. Hc Girr,several particular exceptions
were taken to the regularity of the proceedings, which would require more particular consideration, had we not already come to the
conclusion that the section under which the seizure was made, and
is now sought to be justified, was unconstitutional and void. Still,
there is one question to which it is proper to advert. This is in the
nature bf an action of trespass vi et armis, and the question is,
whether it will lie against an officer, who merely acts under the
direction of a warrant from a magistrate, and does not go beyond
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the line of his duty, as marked out by his warrant. This is certainly
an important consideration, inasmuch as it is for the interest of the
community that subordinate and executive officers should, as far as
-possible, be protected in the full and fearless discharge of their duties,
leaving all responsibility for errors in judgment, and irregularities
of process, -torest upon others.. But this principle must'have some
limit; it would be dangerous and injuiious to the'common rights of
citizens, if one man, under. the mere 'color or semblance of legal
process, could justify the arrest and imlrisonment of the'person, or
-the-seizure and temoval of the property of' anothrer, without any
responsibility. And we take the well settled line of distintion to
be this:'If the magistrate or tribunal, from which the probess'issues,
his jurisdiction, -and the-process is apparently regular, the officer
may safely follow and obey it;' and justify himself under it.+ But if
the magistrate hap no jurisdiction, the i rocess is. not merely voidsble,-tut wholly void; the -officer taking' prori-tyunder :it, has ne
a ithority, and is therefore liable to an action of*trespass..
-Tecase already cited of .Entickvs. Carr'ion'2'Wils' 275, and
19 Howelrs State Trials, -1029, was an action of 'trespass'against
'messengers, under a warrant from the Secretary of State.' .Itbeing
held that the-warrant was 'void, because not'within the 'jurisdiction
of the magistrate, the action was' sustained, and considerable dam'
ages recovered. -Where one is' committed tuder process wholly void,
a
vs.' Forrester, 5-M. & S. 314.- -So, for
trespass will lie. Groome
upon
by
order
6f-a
magistrate; who had no-jurisdiction.
goods levied
ee C6urt
Branwefl vs. Pennec, 7 B. & C. 536. So, in the S-upr&
of the United States, Marshall, C. J. said: "It is a principle, that
a depision -of sch a tribunal .[i court" mar.tial] 'in "a case clearly
without its jurisdiction, cannot protect' the officer' who exectes it.
-Wise vs. Withers, 3 Cranch, ;337. - So' in New York. --.When' it
appears on the face'of the prodess, that the court brrmagistratb-had
no "jirisdiction, ii is void, and affords io"protection t6 the officer
who has 'acied.under it.- &vacool vs. Bouglton; 5 Wend. 172.
But if' the court' had jurisdiction, and the process is right on its
face though wrongly: issued, the - officer is justified. Lewis vs.
Pamer, 6 Wend. 869.- The princiile is recognized in many cases
-
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in this Commonwealth, and is stated by Metcalf, J., by way of
illustration, in a very recent case. In case of imprisonment, a
jailor is not answerable, "unless he acts under the mandate of an
inferior court, which has not jurisdiction of the cause, or by virtue
of a warrant, which, on its face, shows the i agistrate's want of"
jurisdiction." Y7olger vs. Hinckley, 5 Cush. 266.'
The law relied on for a justification, being void, gave the magistrate no jurisdicton and no authority to issue the search-wArrant,
the officer cannot justify the seizure under it and therefore an
action lies against him for the taking.
Judgment foi the plaintiff.

Court of Appeals of Maryland, June Term, 1853.
NATHAN H. WiARE ET AL. vs. CHARLES R. RICHARDSON.
1. In cases of devises or conveyances to trustees. for the separate use of married
* women, the Court will, if possible, so construe them as to vest the legal estate in
the trustees, because this will best effectuate the intention of the donor.
2. A deed conveyed real estate to a trustee "in trust," that a married woman "shall
and may, during her life, have, hold, use, occupy and enjoy" the same, "uand the
rents, issues and profits thereof," "to her owt. proper use and benefit notwithstanding her coverture, and.that without the let, trouble or control of her present
or any future husband," or being liable for his debts, "as fully in every respect
as if she was sole and unmarried, and from and immediately after her death, then
to andfor the use dnd benefit of her legal heirs and representatives." Held: That
this deed created but a mere equitable life estate in the married woman, and that
it executed the legal estate in her heirs and, consequently that the rule in Shelley's case did not apply.

Appeal from the Equity side of the Baltimore County Court.
The facts of the case sufficiently appear in the opinion of tle
Court.
T. S. Alexander and T. Y. Tralsh, for appellants.
W. H. Norris, for appellees.
MASON, J.-This case has been argued most elaborately and with
distinguished ability. Every suggestion appears to have been made
and every authority invoked calculated to elucidate the intricate
questions involved in the present, controversy. With the benefit of
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all this light, we are constrained nevertheless to recognize the difficulties which environ the case.
In order to a proper understanding of the case, we deem it important to state somqwhat at length the allegations of the bill, and
the subsequent proceedings thereon.
The appellee, Charles Richardsonj.filed his bill of complaint inBaltimore County Court, s a court of equity, against. the appellants, aking for a sale of the real estate of Eliza -Richardson, deceased; for the payment of her debts. He claimed to be a creditor in
his own right, and -also as administrator de bonis non of Robert
Richardson, deceased. The bill alleges that letters testamentary
were granted on the estate of the said Robet to the said Eliza
Richardson,- who, by virtue thereof, possepsed herself of the personal estate of her testator, and partially administered the same,
but died before she had returned any account of her admistration.
The complainant thereupon administered upon her estate, and.also
upon the estate de boni8s non of Robert Richardson. -The bi
'charges that Mrs-. Richardson died largely indebted; and that her
personal estate was insufficient to pay -her debts, and thereupon
prays the sale of her real-estate under the direction of the chancery
court; and that the proceeds of sale. may be appropriated to the
payment of her debts.
The real estate iyvhich the complainant seeks to charge with the
debts ;f Mrs. Richardson, was. derived by the deed of Areanah
Kennedy, executed in the year 1809- to Samuel N. Ridgely, which
is set out at length in the record. That deed is, in -part, in these
words: "witnesseth, that the said Areanah Kennedy, in consideratioh of the natural love and affection which she hath and beareth
towards Elizabeth Richardson, wife of Robert Richardson, and in
consideration of .the sum of five shillings, current money, to her in
hand paid by the said Samuel N. Ridgely, at or before the ensealing and delivery of these presents, the receipt whereof is hereby
acknowledged,.hath granted, bargained and sold, aliened, enfeoffed,
released, conveyed'and confirmed, 'and by these 'presents doth
grant, bai'gain and sell, allen,. enfeoff, release, .convey and confirm
unto the said Samuel N. Ridgely, his heirs and assigns, " (here the

WARE ET AL. vs. RICHARDSON.

property is described,) "to have and to hold the same and every partthereof unto the said Samuel N. Ridgely, his heirs and assigns
forever, in trust, nevertheless that the said Areanah Kennedy shall
and may, during the time of her natural life, have, hold, use and
enjoy the said piece or parcel of ground and premises, and the
rents, issues and profits thereof, and the same convert to her own
use and benefit, and from and immediately after her decease, then
upon this further. trust, that the said Elizabeth Richardson shall and
may during her life, have, hold, use, occupy, possess and enjoy the
said pieco or parcel of ground and premises, and the, rents, issues,
and profits thereof, and the same to convert to her own proper use
and benefit,'notwithstanding her coverture, and that without the
let, trouble or conrol of her present or any future husband, or
being lin any manner liable or subject to the payment of his debts,
as fully in every respect as if she was sole and unmarried, and
from and immediately. after the death of the said Elizabeth, then to
and for the use and benefit of the legal heirs and representatives of
the said Elizabeth, and to and for no other intent and purpose.
The defendants in their answer insist, that under the terms of
the foregoing deed, the said Eliza had but a life estate in the premises thereby conveyed, and that on her death the fee devolved
upon her children and h.eirs, namely: the complainant and his deceased brother. The first question, therefore, which is' presented
by the present record -is, whether Elizabeth Richardson had a fee
or a life estate in the realty embraced in the deed from Areanah
Kennedy.
In determining this question we must first consider whether the
rule established in Shelley's case, applies to the deed which we are

now called on to construe.
No question connected with the law has elicited more learning
and discussion than that which relates to the nature and operation
of this rule, as a principle of law for the interpretation of Wills and
deeds; and none occupies a more prominent place in the history of
the law of real property.
The controversies on this subject from the earliest periods down
to the present day, have been vehement protracted and even bitter,
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eliciting the profoundest logic, severest criticism; and deepest and
most laborious research. In one instance, even, this controversy
resulted in the dismemberment of the Court of King's Behob, and
at another time this renowned discussion, says. Chancellor. Keut,
became so vehement and protracted as to rouse -the .sceptre of
'PerHi
vs.
the haughty Elizabeth. The great case for example of
Blake, 4 Burr. 2579, which excited the most noble and illustrious
talents of the age in its discussion through- every department.. of
Westminster Hall, originated in the island of Jamaica; as far backas the year 1746. After the case had traveled through t~ie eourts
passed the Atlantic on appeal to the King in counof that island, itcil. The final termination (the result at the last of compromise) of.
this protracted litigation was in 1777, after an; exhausting'controversy of upwards of thirty years. When ord Mansfield delivered his opinion in Perrin vs. Mlake, he used certain sareastio
expressions which gave offence to his associate, Mr.Justice. Yates,
who immediately thereupon resigned his. seat s a judge. of -K. B,
and was transferred to the C. B. Though volumes. have beenwrittein
upon the subject, and more than a century expended in its investigation, still it to this day remains a fruitful subject of strife and dis.
cussion, as the present case abundantly illustrates.
In'S elley's edse, 1 Co. 104; the- rule was laid'.down, on the authority of a number of cases from the Year Books, to be, "that
when the ancestor, by any gift or conveyance taketh an estate of
freehold, and in the same gift or conveyance an estate is- limited
either mediately or immediately, to his heirs, in fee or in tail,- the
heir8 are words of limitation of the estate, and not words of.purchase." Chancellor Kent, however, adopts the following definition
of the rule by Mr. Preston, as being .more. full . and: accurate.
"When a person takes an esiate of freehold, -legally.or"equitably,
under a deedS, will or other writing, and in-the same instrument
there is a limitation by way of remainder,'either: with- or without
the interposition of another estate, of an interest of the same
legal or equitable quality, to his heir,, or. heirs of his. body, as a
class of persons to take in succession, from generation to. genera-
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tion, the limitation to the heirs entitles the ancestor to the whole'
estate." Preston on Estates, vol. 1, 263.
In cases, therefore, where the words " heirs" or "1heirs of the
body' are used they will be construed to limit or define the estate intended to be conveyed, and will not be treated as words of purchase,
and no supposed intention on the part of the testator or grantor
arising from the estate being conveyed, in the first instance, for
life, will be permitted to control their operation as words of limitation. - In all such cases the estate becomes immediately executed
in the ancestor, who becomes seised of an 'estate of inheritance.
By force of the unbending construction given to these terms, it imputed to the'grantor or testator in legal .contemplation, an intention to use the terms in their legal sense, and to give them their
legal effect, though it should defeat even a real intention: to' the contrary. In other words, they are regarded as conclusive evidence of
the intent df the testator.
There are, however, well recognized exceptions to this rule: two'of
which we will advert to at present, in general terms. In the first
place, whenever, the test'ator or grantor annexes words of explanation to the word " heirs," indicating that he meant to use t]le term
in b qualified sense, as a mere descriptio"personarum, or particular
designation of certain individuals, and that they and not the ancestor were to be points or termini from the succession to the estate
was to eminate 6r take its 'start, then in all such cases where the
word heir is thus explained or restricted, it is to be treated as a
term of purchase and not of limitation. For example, the expressions, heirs now living, children, issue, &c., are words of limitation

or purchase, as will best accord with the manifest intention of him
who empl6ys them. .Under this qualification of the rule the intention prevails against the strict construction.
The second exception' to which We will advert is, that where the
estate limited to the ancestor is an equitable or trust estate and
that to the heirs an executed use- or legal estate, the two estates under the rule in Shelley,'s case will not coalesce in the ancestor; and
the result would be the same if the estate for life was a legal estate)
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and that limited to the heirs an equitable estate. Horne vs. _yeth,
-4 Har. & Johns. 432.
Whatever may have been the origin or philosophy of this rule,
whether it was introduced to secure to the lord of the fee the fruits
and incidents of wardship and marriage which he had a right to
claim from the heir; or whether the more reasonable idea of Mr.
Justice Blackstone be correct, that the rule had its origin in the
desire to facilitate the alienation of land, and to throw it into the
track of commerce one generation sooner, by giving the power to
the ancestor of immediate disposition of the estate to the exclusion
of the heirs, the rule with its qualifications must nevertheless prevail
as a part of our system ofreal law, because ii hao been fully recognized and adopted as the settled law of Maryland. The court
in Horne vs. Lyeth say, 'to disregard rules of interpretation sanctioned by a succession of ages, and by the decisions of the most enlightened judges, under pretence that the reason of the rule no
longer exists, or that the rule itself is unreasonable, would not
only prostrate the great land marks of property, bt 'would intr6duce a latitude of construction, boundless in its range and pernicious in its consequences.
The rule applies clearly to the deed we are now considering, unless it can be shown that it falls within one of the other of the
enumerated exceptions. Did, then, Mrs. Kennedy use any apt
words in the deed to indicate that the heirs of Mrs. Richardson,
and not she herself, were to be the termini from which the succession was to commence, and thereby create in Mr. Richardson a
mere life estate ? In other words, are there any expressions in
the deed sufficient to convert the words Ilegal heirs," from words
of limitation into words of purchase ? There are none in our
opinion capable of restricting the terms to particular individuals,
instead of the entire legal representatives of Mrs. Richardson as a
class. On the contrary the language employed is of the most general character, and is indeed as full and as comprehensive as that
employed in Shelley's case itself, -and we cannot suppose that it will
be seriously contended that the present deed, if it were a conveyance directly to Mrs. Richardson herself, without, the interposition
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of the trustee, and she was a feme sole, would not be embraced
within the operation of the rule.
But in the second place, it is contended that under the peculiar
provisons of the present deed an estate of a different nature has
been created in Mrs. Richardson, from that conferred upon her
heirs, and that therefore the two will not incorporate in Mrs. Richardson, thus bringing the case within the operation of the secQnd
exception to the rule.
To avoid such a conclusion it is argued by the appellee on the
one hand, that the present instrument is a deed of bargain and sale,
and that as such, the use was executed in Ridgely the trustee, and
that the limitations to use, are mere trusts in equity, and that both
irs. Richardson and her heirs are cestui que trusts seised only of
an equitable estate, and that as such they will coalesce in Mrs.
Richardson under the rule. On the other hand, it is cbntended
that the intention of the grantor should prevail, and that the present deed should be treated as afeoffment to accomplish that purpose. If regarded as a feoffment it is said that the legal estate
would be executed in the heirs of Mrs. Richardson, but that she
herself would take but a mere equitable life estate.
Whether the present deed, as an abstract question, be afeoffment
or a bargain and sale, is one more difficult than important for us to
decide. If it be a case where the intention of the grantbr is to
prevail against the strict rules of interpretation, then this cour
will construe the deed as a feofment or a bargain and sale as will
most effe6tually accomplish that intejition.
In this connection it becomes necessary to inquire when the legal
estate vests in the trustee, and thereby becomes a trust estate, or
when it vests in the cestui que use, under the statute of uses.
A use is, where tlh legal estate of lands was in a certain person,
and a trust was also reposed in him, that some other person should

take and enjoy the rents and profits. In other words, a use was a
mere confidence in a friend, (before the statute of uses,) that the
feoffees to whom the. lands were given, should permit the feoffor,
and his heirs, and such other person as he might designate, to receive the profits of the land. Gilbert on Uses, 1.
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The whole system of uses, however, was abolished or remodeled
by the statute of 27 Henry 8, chap. 10, commonly known as the
Statute of Uses. By the provisions of that statute the use was
transferred into possession by converting the estate or.interest of
the cestui que ue into a legal estate, and.Fy, destroyifig-the.intermediate estate of the feoffee. The. strict construction which was
given to this. statute b7 the judges of its. time, and the inconvenience and injusticewhich thereby followed, led,. after. a. lapse of.
time, through the interposition of a. court 6f ; hancery,.and -the ingenuity and learning of lawyers, to the. establishment of a regular
and enlightened system of. trusts. In this .way, uses were partially
revived under the name of trusts. In. regard to this revial of .the
equity jurisdiction in respect to trusts, Lord.. Mansfield has said in.
Burgess vs. WBheate, 1 Bl. R. 123, "that it has not only remedied
the mischiefs of uses so much: complained, of, but has given occasion to raise.ul a system of equity, noble, rational ahd uniform, in
place of a 'system at once unjust and incnvenieiit.. Trusts are
made to answer the exigencies-of families, and all purposes, -without
producing one inconvenience, fraud or private mischief, which the
statute of Henry 8; meant to avoid."
A trust therefore is a use not executed under the statute of Hen.
8, in the cestui que use, but the legal estate is veste& in the grantee
or trustee..
It becomes, however, frequently a matter of difficult solution to
determine when the estate is vested under the statute in the cestui
que use, or when as a trust it vests in the trustee ; 'and tWe present
case is one by no'means free from difficulty' on this point.
The inquiry here is, in whom did :the legal. estate vest.under the
present deed ? It is to be observed, that such, a trust ,as is here
contended for, might readily have been'created. by express terms:
as, for instance, if the property had been conveyed to Ridgely and
his heirs, to the use, or unto the use of him and his heirs in trust
for Mrs. Richardson, it would have been a' complete disposition of
the whole legal estate tQ the trustee. 2 Crabb's L~aw of Real Prop.
508. In -such a case the use and ppsses~ion" which constitute the
legal estate would be vested in the trustee, while the rents and profits
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would belong to the ce8tui que use. But the supposed case is not
this case. If there is a trust in Mrs. Richardson it is not created
by express, technical terms, but it results from the intention of the
grantor to do so, as manifested upon the face of the deed, an intention so clear as not to be defeated or controlled by the strict rules
of interpretation. It is clear that the mere interposition of a trustee to protect and secure a trust estate in a third person even
though a married woman, will not prevent the use from being executed in the cestiti que use, unless there is attached to the trustee
the performance of some active functions or duties in order to support the trust. And a distinction has been taken between a devise
or deed to a person in trust to' collect and pa' over the rents and
profits to another, and a devise in trust to permit another to enjoy
the rents and profits. In the first, the use is executed- in the trustee, in the second, in the eestui que use. It would follow then, were
Mrs. Richardson not a; married woman, or were not the estate by
the terms of the deed: limited to her soleand separateuse, independent of her husband, that this would be a conveyance under the'
statute, and would vest the legal estate in her, notwithstanding her
coverture, or the provision that she was to have but a life. estate.
But in the present case the deed provides that the property shall
be held in trust "for her own proper use and benefit, notwithstanding her coverture," &c., and "as if she was sole or unmarried.".
As has already been intimated, in all cases where a deed or will
involvesan object or purpose which cannot be carried into operation without the active agency of the trustee, such as the collecting
and paying over of the rents and profits of land to' a.married
woman for her sole and separate use, the execution of conveyances,
&c., then it becomes a special trust, and not a use executed in her
and the question in -this case, is, does the deed impose such active
duties upon the trustees as will render it necessary for him to have
the legal estate to discharge those duties, or is he a mere nominal,
inactive agent, who is embraced within the Statute of Uses ?
Most of the elementary writers broadly assert, that where the
trustee is to hold in trust for the sole and separate use of a married
woman, it is a trust, and not a use executed under the statute.
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Dig. 456; 2 Crabb's Law of Real Prop. 509;. Clancy oa
flus. and Wife, 256. It is, however, to be regretted, for the sake
of the simplification of this question, that the adjudications cited
by the books, do not with unanimity sustain the proposition to the
length to which it is* stated. Most of the cases cited by the text
writers will be found to relate to deeds or wills which impose upon
'the trustee some active functions, such as collecting and paying
over of rents, &c., and 'while therefore ',they do not contradict the
proposition, they notwithstanding do not sustain it as it is broadly
.announced.
revd.v'gs. $aunders, 1 Vern. 415; Say-and.So
vs. Jones, 1 Ab. Equity Cases, 383; 8 Viper's Abr. 262;
Lord Ch. J. Holt, in South vs. Alleine, 1 Salk. 228; ariffith vs.
Smith, Moore, 743; Bush vs. Allen,. 5 Mod. 63; and a numher of other cases-to the same purpose might be cited.
The intention of the grantor is to prevail in cases like the present, but with this qualification, that it must not contravene-or defeat the established rules of conbtruction, or in other words the intention is to be ascertained by the legal rules of interpretation:.
Unless therefore this. deed, in accordance;with one of those rules
assigns to the, trustee the performance of some duty necessary for
thq enjoyment of the estate by the feme covert, the legal estate
would not vest in the trustee. - It would -seem to follow as a necessary consequence, -fromthe very nature of the present tranmmction,
that a deed to a trustee for the sole and aeparate use of a married
woman, would imply that the trustee's aid was invoked, and his
active services required, to support th. independent character of
the wife. The rights and powers of married women are ordinarily
merged in those of their husbands, and whenever it becomes important to invest her with sole and independent powers, it -becomes
necessary that that character should be exercised. through the
medium of a trustee. It is now settled that where bequests or
conveyances are made to married women for their separate use,
without the nomination of truistees, the husbands in equity will be
considered as trustees for their wives, and will be required to comply with the intention of the donor. (Clancy on flus. and Wife,
257.) A separate estate in real pr~perty'could not be enjoyed by
I1Cruise
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a married woman unless through the interposition of a trustee,,
which circumstance of itself would imply the performance of some
active duties on his part. Not so, however, with persons not labor.
ing under the same disabilities with married women. In such cases
no intervening agent is necessary to enable them to enjoy the property, and therefore the legal estate is vested in them when it
would not be in a feme covert. Thus in the case of Brough~ton vs.
Langeley, 2 Ld. Raym. 873, where lands were devised to trustees
and their heirs, tb the intent to permit A to receive the rents for
his life, &c., it was determined that this would hav been a plain
trust at common law, and as such executed by the statutei. And so
it would have been even if the cestui que trust were a married
woman; provided the estate was not limited to her sole and separate use.
It is true that there are some cases which have carried this doctrine
so far as to embrace within its operation deeds and wills conveying
property to married women for their separate use, and have declared the estate to be executed under the statute in the feme covert.
The only cases brought to our notice favoring this doctrine are
Williams vs. Waters, 14 Mees. & Wels. 166 ; Dbuglas vs. Congreve, 1 Beavan, 59; and South vs. Alleine, 1 Salk. 228. In the
first of those cases, Williams vs. Waters, it would seem that a
dierent interpretation would have been given to the 'instrument by
a Court of Chancery, from a remark made by- Rolfe, Baron, in his
opinion. He observed "it is said we are to construe the deed
otherwise, because so the intention of -theparties will be effected ; but
so it may in other ways; it will now, by the interposition of a court of
equity." And Baron Parke says, "we cannot collect clearly from
the words of the deed, that they intended to give the trustees an
active trust, to exclude the husband from control, by giving the
estate to the trustees in' order to pay -over the rents' and profits
to the wife." Thus this case sanctions the principle, that where an
active trust is imposed upon the trustee he takes the legal estate.
The case of -Douglasvs. Congr've is, in important particulars, dissimilar from the case now before us. There, the devise was to the
wife for her life, for her independent use and benefit, followed by a
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direct devise after her death, to. her husband, for hi i ratvral life
with remainder to the use of the heirs of her ,body, -kc., , The
Court decided, that the strict rules of construction yee to prevail,
because an intention to the contrary was nosuetly. manifest
on the face of the will. . The case of "Soui vs. Alleins, it must be
admitted,' directly; supports the views -of. the .fappiltee's .o nsel.
But the authority of that case is gre stly weakened, if not entirely
overthrown, by the faci - that C. J. Holt dissented from tbe opinion
of Rokesby and Eyre, justices,;and :that. the opinion of the chief
justice has been .-repeatedly sustained by subsequent decisions of
the higheqt authority.
The position assumed by the counsel for. the appellee, that it
does not necessarily follow by vesting the legal estate in the wife,
that'thereby you establish the marital rights of the husband ai
oppositition to the contrary intention of the grantor,we -think is
no sustained bythe authotities. 3n ist.of these -cases itis .onceded, that by executing .the use in thd .Wifq the,
.biau4.ac eu
control over the property, .ad:tA very reslt
.a
son why a different co nstrtion .hould-.eogivei.,othe ins .m. t,
in order to effectuate the Ju"ntion.of the grantor., Tutihei.c.asq of
BJu8h vs. Allen,.. 5 Mod. 03, Justice Rokesby in..reply -to ..the
argument that the legal estate vested in the wife, remarked, "but then
the husband shall intermeddle, when the devisor. itpded to excbjde
him." ,And in the great case upon this subject, Barton,vs.- Harton,
7 Term R. 652; Lord Kenyon said, "that whether this were &
use executed in the trustees or not must depend Ulpin the.intention
of the devisor. : This provislon was made to secure to afeme coverte
a separate allowance, to .effectuate which it was essentially. necessary that the trustees'should-take theoestate, with the.,use executed,
for otherwise the husband would be entitled to receive the profits,
and so defeat the object of. the. devisor.", And also in .the case of
Williams vs. Waters, 14 Mees. & Wels. 166; Parke, Baron, concedes, that the husband could not be excluded if the legal estate
vested in the wife.
In the consideratioii of this case it would be difficult for us to
refer to the numerous cases which relate to the subject, much more
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to attempt to reconcile them with each other. That there is some
conflict of opinion upon the subject, cannot be denied. The later,
and more modern decisions, however, seem to favor a more liberal
construction of deeds and wills in order to reach the real intention
of their makers, and therefore in all cases where an estate is devised or conveyed to trustees for the separate use of a married
woman and her heirs, this Court will, if possible, so construe the
instrument as to vest the legal estate in the trustees, because such
a construction will best effectuate the intention of the donor. We
think this conclusion would follow from the general principles which
we have endeavored to maintain in this opinion, and is warranted
by a current of decisions of the highest weight and authority.
The case of Bfarton vs. Bfarton, 7 Term R. 652, fully sustains
our views, and no higher authority can be invoked on any subject
than that of Lord Kenyon.
Clancy on Husband aid Wife,
256, broadly maintaiiis the very proposition for which we are contending. He says, "where lands are devised in trust, as to the
rents and profits, for the sole and separate use of a married womaan,
it is immaterial whether the trust be declared to be "to pay the
rents and profits to her" or "to permit her to receive the. rents
and profits," as in either case, it would' be held that the use was
not executed. In addition to the cases we have already cited, we
refer to Hawkins vs. Iuscombe, 2 Swans. 891; Ayer vs. Ayer,
16 Pick. 827;. Pranciscus vs. Reigart, 4 Watts, 109; no
.Escheator of St. Phillips and St. Michaels' vs. Smith, 4 McCord,
452. The cases in Pickering and McCord's Reports are in all respects, like the case we are now considering, and fully sustain the
conclusions to which we have come. In both those cases the question grew out of a deed, and very similar to the one now before us'
In each, the only duty imposed upon the trustee was to hold. the
estate for the sole and separate use of the wife, and it was held in
both cases that, because a separate provision was intended to be
made for the wife, it was sufficient to prevent the execution of the
estate in her. In the case of Ayer vs. Ayer, the Court has gone
quite at length into the subject, and reviewed many of the leading
cases relating to it.
32
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It has been urged that more strictness is required in construing
deeds than wills, and that as this is a deed the technical rules of
construction should apply, with unbending force. To this proposition we do not assent. Cruise (1 vol. 459) says, that the same
mode of construction is adopted in cases of deeds as in cases of
devises, in questions like the present; .and the same -'ule is recognized in Ayer vs. Ayer,.16 Pick. 330.
The case of Afatthews' Le8see vs. Ward (10 Gill &Johns. 443), has
been pressed upon us, as a controlling authority in support of the
proposition that the present deed should be treated as a deed 6f
bargainand sale. In this 'respect we do not coner with the appellee's counsel. That case has no esliecial bearing upon the one
'we are now considering, except it be to .establish the general pro-position that deeds of bargainand sale have nearly superseded all
other modes of conveyance for passing real estate ih Maryland,
and the other more important and pertinent principle to the present
controversy, that our courts, in construing deeds, will 4ffectuaie, as
far. as possible, the intention of the grantor. Archer, J., who delivered the opinion in Matthews vs. Ward, admits dxpressly that
the deed in that case might be construed to be a feoffmnt, if
the intention of the grantor would warrant such a construction,
and it is declared to be a deed of bargain and sale, because such a
view comports with what was supposed to be the intention of the
grantor. Whenever a conveyance may take effect either at common law or under the statute of uses, it shall operate at the common law, unless the intention of the parties appeirs to -the con-trary. 2 Saund. on Uses and Trusts, 50, (Marg.)
We are of opinion, therefore, that th'6 present deed- creates but a
mere equitable life estate in Mrs. Richardson; and thot it executes
.
:the legal estate -inher heirs.'
I The rest of this opinion, on a question of Equity practice in Maryland, is omitted
-or want of space.-Ed. Law Reoter.

KELLY vs. VALNEY.

In the District Court of Philadhia,April Term, 1854.
KELLY VS. VALNEY.
In ax action on a note, the execution of which was admitted, but the statute of

limitations pleaded, the plaintiff called one who testified that, acting as his attorney, he had addressed a letter through the post-office to the defendant (with
whom the witness was not personally acquainted), on the subject of the claim, to
which he duly received a reply; and that shortly after this, a person called at
his office, who introduced himself as the defendant, and in conversation, made
such a promise as would have taken the case out of the statute. "The defendaAt's
name was an unusual one, and no attempt was made to show a false personation.
Hdd, sufficient prima facie proof of identity, to allow the evidence to go to the
jury.

Rule for a new trial.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
SHARSWOOD, P. J.-The evidence submitted to the jury, upon
which they found a verdict for the plaintiff, was this: Mr. Alsop
addressed a letter to defendant, who resided at Pottsville, informing him that the claim was placed in his hands for collection.
An answer was received in due course of mail, regularly post-marked.
A short time afterwards a gentleman called at the office of Mr. Alsop
and introduced himself as the defendant. He admitted the debt,
and promised to pay it if the plaintiff would forbear to sue for a
certain period of time. The counsel' who was the witness by whom
these facts were proved, had never seen him before nor since. The
defendant was not present at the trial, and of course that means of
identifying his person was not afforded. 'The question is, whethei
there is now any evidence to submit to the jury that the person
who made this admission and promise was the defendant in the
action. If there was, the verdict must stand; if not, judgment must
be entered for defendant, on the reserved point.
The authorities which bear upon this question, both in England
and this country, are conflicting. A review of them will show that
we are at liberty to determine the case before usupon principle.
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It is well settled in this country, that as a general rule, identity
of name is prima facie evidence of personal identity. Thus, if title
be shown in A. B., a deed purporting to have been executed by
him, may be read in evidence without anything more tending to
.how that the person executing the deed was the same A. B. in
whom the title was vested. Jackson vs. Goes, 13 Johns. t18;
Jackson vs. King, 5 -Cowen, 237; and this oven if there be
a variation in the spelling, provided the two names are idemh sonantes.
Jack8on vs. Cody, 9 Cowen, 140. Our own case of Atchison vs.
McCulloch, 5 Watts, 13, establishes that it is not a prerequisite
to the admission in evidence of a regular deed from a warrantee
that the grantor should be proved to be the identical person to whom
the land was granted by the commonwealth.
The question has necessarily arisen wherever itlhas been attempted
to prove the execution of an instrument by -evidence of the handwriting of a subscribing witness, deceased or out of the country.
What does the subscribing witness atteit? Simply that the instrument in question was signed or sealed and delivered by a person
bearing or assuming to bear that name.
What, then, does proof'of the handwriting of a subscribing witness
amount to, more than the evidence of a witness testifying that he
saw a person called or who called himself by the name in the paper,
execute that instrument, but whether it was the defendant in this
court he does not know.
The earliest authority to which my researches have led me, is
.Minot vs. Batis, of -hich there is a short note in Buller N. P.
171. ' If the defendant plead non est factum, the plaintiff must
prove the execution of the deed, and proof that one who called
himself B. executed, is not sufficient. Of this determination,
however, nothing is further known, and its chief weight is
derived from the character of the book in which it is to be found
to be cited and given as law. Who was the original author of
Buller's Nisi Prius is not certainly known. It is supposed to have
been the work of Mr." Bathurst, afterwards Lord Apsley. Sir
Francis Buller only made some additions to it. In this particular
,matter it will be seen that the book cannot claim the authority of
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his name, as that was subsequently thrown upon the other side of
the question.
This point has been the subject of frequent discussion and decision in the English and American Courts. The next in order is
Gough vs. Cecil, a MS. case, of which the only note is in 1 Selw.
N. P. 407. It was in the C. B. in 1784. Lord Loughborough had
nonsuited a plaintiff who asked for a verdict on evidenceof the handwriting of the subscribing witness. A new trial, however, was granted,
the Court appearing to be equally divided on the argument, but
Lord Loughborough having it held over to inquire into the practice
which he said ought to govern, it would seem that he changed his
mind.. Lord Kenyon followed a; different rule. In Wallis vs. Delaneyi, in 1790, 7 T. R. 26, note, he expressly ruled that evidence
of the handwriting of the subscribing witness alone was not enough,
and his ruling seems to have been acquiesced in and followed. Barnes
vs. Trompo'wsky, 7 T. R. 265. The Court of Common Pleas in 1798i
decided otherwise in Adam vs. Kerr, 1 Bos. & Pul. 360, in which
MUr. Justice Buller, who delivered the opinion, said: "the handwriting of the obligor need not be proved; that of the attesting
witness, when proved, is evidence.of everything on the face of the
paper which imports to be sealed by the party." Lord Ellenborough
was also of this opinion, as is seen in Nelson vs. Whittall, 1 Barn.
& Ald. 19, though the point did not arise there. He said: "it has
been the. constant practice in cases where the subscribing witness is
dead never to look at anything beyond proof of the handwriting of
the witness, and I should think that in all cases it is prima facie
evidence of the instrument having been executed by the person
whose name it bears." That this practice was not quite so constant
as Lord Ellenborough supposed, is shown by two Nisi Prius cases,
immediately preceding or about the same time. Middleton vs.
Sandford, 4 Camp. 34, and Parkinsvs. ifawkshaw, 2 Starkie, 239.
The first before Dampier, and the other before Holroyd. Lord
e'enterden, however, followed in the track of Lord Ellenborough.
J age vs. lfann, Mood. & Malkin, 79; Xitehell vs. Johnson, ibid,
176; and so did C. J. Best, Kay vs. Brooknman, ibid, 286, S. 0. 3
('. & P. 555. In fMkitelocke vs. Mfusgrove, 1 Crompt. & Mees. 511,
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the same question arose in the Court of Exchequer, and was decided
against the presumption of identity. It was a very. strong casef
for the maker of the note was a marksman, and his identity could
not be shown by evid~nce of his handwriting, -so that a party holding such a paper by the death of the attesting witness -would be
deprived of his ordinary means of proof, and must rely upon some
other unprovided source.- Yet Baron Bayley said, interrupting the
counsel for the plaintiff: "We do presume that everything was
done rightly. We presume that the note was signed by a person of
the name of Francis Musgrove, but how does that appear to be the
defendant ?" And it is observed in a note by the reporter, that
"Lord Lyndhurst was present when the rule nisi was moved for,
on which occasion all the authorities were brought before the Court,
and his lordship observed that it appeared to him that it would be
very extraordinary if some evidence of identity were not necessary."
This Was in 1883. Upon this precise point the sufficiency of evidence of handwriting of the subscribing witness, without more, there
are American cases, but they are unhappily also in conflict. The
favor of the presumption is Slu y vs. Champlin, 4 Johns. .461,
followed by other New York cases. Against it is Bobardevs. Wove,
1 Dana, 155.
There have been other and later cases in England, not in accordance with the principles of the decision in Wlitlocke vs. Musgrove.
Jones vs. Jones (9 Mees. & Welsby, 75), had, indeed, a similar
result, but then it was relied on as a circumstance, that the name
was a very common one, and, in point of fact, there were several
of the same name in the neighborhood. In Warren vs. Anderson
(8 Scott, 384), the' Court of Common Pleas held, in an action
against the acceptor of a bill of exchange, where the only proof of
the handwriting of the defendant was that of a bank clerk, who
stated that two years before he saw a person calling himself by the
defendant's name sign a book; that he had never. seen him since,
but that he thought the handwriting was the same, and had since
seen checks bearing th same signature,-that it was sufficient to
go to the jury.
The last case I have been able to find is Sewell-vs. Evans (4 Ad.
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& Ellis, N. S. 626), a case very similar to the one before us. A witness
stated that he introduced a person of the name of defendant to
the plaintiff as a customer, and that he saw him write a letter,

which was produced, and which established the claim; he had not
seen the person since, and did not know whether that person was
the defendant. It was left to the jury, and the verdict for the
plaintiff was sustained by C. J. Denman and his associates of the
Queen's Bench. .This was in 1843.
Human tribunals must often proceed upon presumptions. There
are many such cases, so frequent and familiar as to escape observation. These presumptions are safe, for they are founded upon experience, which is the best interpreter as well as judge of actions and
events. It is the suggestion of experience, for example, that men
do not commit crimes without some powerful temptation or motive,
and we ought, therefore, in the first instance to presume in favor of

that which'is honest. So far has this been carried, that when
guilt can be established only by proving a negative, that negative
must in most cases be proved by the party alleging the guilt,
though the general rule of law devolves the burden of proof on the
party holding the affirmative. (1 Green]. on Ev. 85.) No stronger
illustration can be given of the length to which Courts have gone
in making these presuiptions, than our own case of Breiden vs.
Paff (12 Serg. & R. 430). In ejectment, plaintiff claimed under
a deed from A, and B his wife, granting the wife's estate. It was
proved that she had married succesiiyely three husbands before A,
and it was held that the Court might leave it to the jury, without

evidence, to presume that they were all dead.

C. J.Gibson says,

which is very much to our purpose, "1There are sometimes cases
when it is unavoidably necessary to decide on the existence of
facts without a particle of evidence on either side, and if a decision
in a particular way would implicate a party to the transaction in
the commission of a crime, or any offence against good morals, it
ought to be avoided, for the law-will not gratuitously impute crime
to any one, the presumption being in favor of innocence till guilt
appear."
If the person who called on Mr. Alsop was not the defendant,
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there was not merely a fraud-a false personation-but the plaintiff
must have procured it. Identity is easily disproved by confronting'
the party with the witness. If the defendant had made an affidavit
after the trial, denying the fact and alleging surprise, w.e would
undoubtedly have granted-a new trial. The absence of this satisfies
us that at all events there is no practical injustice in our present
decision; and, indeed, -the discretionary power of the Courts in
granting a new trial may be mentioned as one of the safeguards of
justice in all such cases.
The case of Sailor vs. ffertzogg, (2 Barr, 182), may, perhaps, be
considered as the latest case in our owi books, and inconsistent
with this determination. It was there held that it is not sufficient
to admit an insolvent petition from one underiwhom the other party
claims that the names are identical, and twenty-five years having
elapsed since the filing thereof. In that case the soundness of the
decision in ewell'vs. -Evanswas recognized, and the case put on
the ground of the remoteness of the transaction, which, of coursd,
throws diffculty in the way of disproving the identity. Neither
that case nor Jones'vs. Jone8 (9 M. &W. 75), before us cited,
touch our case, for the name Theodore Yalney is an undommon one
and the transaction recent.
It is in just such a case as this that the argument ab in onvenienti most conclusively avails. If the presumption is to be rejected,
then why may not every witness called to prove the handwriting of
a party to a note, be asked, how do you know that the person whose
handwriting youtestify to is the defendant, and not some one else
of the same name? If the defendant does not choose to attend the
trial, how is this objection to be got over? May we not with great
propriety adopt, as Lord 0. J.Denman did in Sewell vs. Evans, the
observation of Lord Abinger and Baron Alderson, in Green 7 ield8
vs. Crawford (9 M. & W. 314), a case of similar character, as applicable to this case, and say: "The transactions of tlhb world could
not go on if such an objection was to prevail."
Rule discharged.

